We estimate jointly three types of discrete-choice labor decisions of farm couples: farm work, off-farm work, and hired farm labor. Using a 16-choice multinomial logit model, we find that operators' and spouses' farm labor are substitutes. Hired farm labor increases with farmers' qualifications, perhaps substituting for the couples' labor inputs. Other adults in the households substitute for the farm labor input of the farm couple and hired workers.
Introduction
This paper presents the first attempt to estimate jointly three types of discrete-choice labor decisions of farm couples: farm work, off-farm work, and hired farm labor. Most empirical analyses of farmers' time allocations have focused on off-farm labor decisions.
Few studies looked at either off-farm work and hired labor jointly or at off-farm work and farm work jointly. Here we estimate a model that encompasses all three decisions, using recent French farm census data.
In particular, we estimate a multinomial logit model with 16 choices, including all the permutations of four binary decisions: farm operator's off-farm work, spouse's farm work, spouse's off-farm work, and hired farm labor. All farm operators in our data set work on the farm by definition. Most previous analyses of the farmers' time allocation problem looked at the off-farm labor participation of the farm operators (e.g., Sumner 1982) or the joint offfarm labor participation of farm operators and their spouses (Huffman and Lange 1989; Tokle and Huffman 1991; Lass and Gempesaw 1992) . Buttel and Gillespie (1984) , Kimhi (1994) and Kimhi and Lee (1996) analyzed the joint farm labor and off-farm labor participation decisions of farm couples. Findeis and Lass (1992) and Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996) looked jointly at off-farm labor participation and the use of hired labor. Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996) , in an earlier analysis of French data, concluded that hired labor is a complement for the operator's farm work and a substitute for the spouse's farm work. However, this conclusion was reached without directly allowing for endogenous farm labor participation decisions. We believe that a more complete system of interrelations between the labor decisions can be found by adding the farm labor participation decision.
The following section provides a theoretical background and describes the empirical approach used in this paper. Most applications in the literature used a joint estimation of a system of participation equations for similar problems. Our view is that this strategy suffers from an internal incoherency problem. We described the alternative approach, which estimates a multinomial model. The paper continues with a presentation of the data used in this study and descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables. After that, the empirical results are presented and discussed.
Theory and empirical approach
Farm household models have been used for more than two decades to motivate empirical studies of farmers' time allocation. These models assume a unitary model of household utility maximization over consumption and leisure of all family members, subject to time and budget constraints. Huffman (1991) provided the most common specification of such models. Kimhi (1994) extended this specification to allow for zero farm work, after observing that in a multiple-person household, it is not necessarily true that all household members work on the family farm. There have been two opposite approaches in the literature to the treatment of hired labor. The original approach considered hired labor and family labor as perfect substitutes, and assumed that the wage of hired workers is equal to the off-farm wage of the farm family. In this case one obtains the usual separability property, that the wage determines farm labor input regardless of the off-farm participation decisions of family members. The opposite approach has been not to assume perfect substitutability, and treat hired labor as another farm input that does not deserve special attention when analyzing farmers' time allocation decisions.
In this paper, we too do not assume that hired labor and family labor are perfect substitutes, but we want to deal explicitly with hired labor for the sake of the empirical analysis. This is what Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996) did in their earlier study of French farm households, but they assumed an internal solution for the couple's farm labor input, and here we want to allow for corner solutions with respect to spouse's farm labor input. Hence, we use the concept of "effective labor input", introduced by Deolalikar and Vijverberg (1987) , which is a function of family labor input and hired labor input. Effective labor input is not necessarily measured in hours of work. In fact the unit of measurement is not important, because effective labor input appears as an argument in the farm production function only and does not have a market price. What is important for our purposes is that effective labor input is positive while individual labor inputs may be zero. Of course, at least one of the individual labor inputs must be positive.
Specifically, we assume that household utility (U) is a function of household consumption (C) and the vector of household members' home time, T h (housework and leisure).
Each household member can use his time endowment (T) for farm work (T f ), market work (T m ), and/or home time. Hence, the time constraint is (in vector notation):
Non-negativity constraints are imposed on market work and farm work of each household member: T f ≥ 0 and T m ≥ 0. Consumption is constrained by household income, which is composed of: (i) net farm income, which is explained below; (ii) off-farm labor income, which is the sum of off-farm earnings of all household members (Y mi ); and (iii) non-labor income (Y o ).
Net farm income is farm income (Y f ), which is a function of effective farm labor input (L f ), minus the expenditures on hired workers (E), which is a nonlinear function of hired labor input (H). Effective labor input is denoted as L f (T f ,H). The resulting budget constraint is:
The household optimization problem is to maximize U(C, T h ; Z u ) subject to the time, budget, and non-negativity constraints, where Z j are exogenous shifters of function j. The optimal solution is characterized by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which are the first-order conditions for maximizing the Lagrange function:
The farm work and off-farm work participation conditions of family members are, respectively, a subset of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
(in vector notation), where µ t = ∂U/∂T h and λ = ∂U/∂C. Participation (an internal solution) occurs when the equality holds. Similarly, the decision to use hired labor on the farm relies on the condition:
If an interior solution occurs for all choices (all household members work both on and off the farm and hired labor is used on the farm), the participation equations (4)-(6) and the constraints (1)-(2) can be solved for the endogenous variables {C, 
These participation equations are obtained by inserting the internal solution in (4)- (6), and replacing the relevant variable in each equation by zero.
Empirical applications of farmers' time allocation decisions mostly focused on the offfarm participation decisions, thereby estimating equations (5)' only, after adding multivariate normal additive stochastic terms. Earlier applications looked only at the farm operator, thereby using a binary probit model. Other applications looked at the joint participation decisions of the farm couple (operator and spouse), and mostly used a bivariate probit model. This approach suffers from an internal coherency problem. Recall that the right hand side of equation (5) and what needs to be used in the right hand side of (5') is a solution that is conditioned on the operator's off-farm labor supply being zero. Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996) showed that individual A's off-farm wage is only relevant for the off-farm participation decision of individual B if in fact individual A is working off the farm. Kimhi (1999) used a similar argument for the joint estimation of farmer women's farm and off-farm work participation equations, and showed that farm attributes affects on the off-farm participation decision significantly only when the woman is working on the farm. However, the endogenous switching model of Kimhi (1999) does not solve the problem completely since it imposes a one-direction conditioning of the participation equations, while in theory all participation equations are determined simultaneously.
A different approach that does not suffer from this internal coherency problem is the indirect utility maximization approach, which has been used by Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996) and by Ahituv and Kimhi (2002) . In this approach, a labor regime is defined as one In this paper we adopt the multinomial logit specification due to the relatively large number of regimes that makes multinomial probit impractical unless one is willing to use simulation techniques.
Data and descriptive statistics
We use data from the 2000 General French Census of Agriculture. A random sample corresponding to 10% of the whole sample was drawn from that Census, totaling 65,593 family farms. The data set includes various farm and family attributes and personal characteristics of family members. In particular, it includes information on farm labor supply of family members and hired workers, and whether the operator and/or spouse work off the farm. We selected only farms operated by couples rather than by single operators, and only those in which the operator and spouse are between 18 and 65 years of age. In order to focus on family composition effects, we also excluded families that included elderly parents or siblings (older than 65 years of age).
After eliminating observations with missing data, our working sample included 35,641 farms.
We divided this sample into 16 labor regimes, including all the permutations of the binary variables indicating the female's work on the farm, the male's work off the farm, the female's work off the farm, and hired labor use on the farm. Note that all males reported working on the farm. 
Empirical results
The multinomial logit results are reported in table 3. The excluded labor regime is regime 9, in which neither the male nor the female works off the farm, the female does not work on the farm, and no hired labor is employed on the farm. Each coefficient therefore represents the effect of an explanatory variable on the tendency of the farm family to choose a particular regime over the alternative of regime 9. Alternatively, one can think of each coefficient as the difference between the coefficients of a particular explanatory variable in the indirect utility functions of a particular regime and regime 9. To save space, we only report whether each coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% or the 1% levels (The full results, including standard errors and t-statistics, are available from the authors upon request). We find that each of the explanatory variables has statistically significant coefficients in at least some of the regimes.
However, because of the number of regimes it is not easy to interpret the coefficients. Hence, as in Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996) , we derive the marginal effects of the explanatory variables. For the continuous explanatory variables (the ages, years on farm, and the numbers of young family members) we compute the derivatives of the probabilities of the regimes with respect to each of the explanatory variables, at the sample means of the explanatory variables.
For the binary explanatory variables, we take the difference between two computed probabilities, one conditional on the variable being equal to unity and one conditional on the variable being equal to zero, when all other explanatory variables are at their sample means. In this latter computation we take into account that when a variable such as a certain farm type obtains the value of unity, all other farm type variables must obtain the value of zero.
Rather than presenting all the marginal effects (they are available from the authors), we compute the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the marginal probabilities each of the participation indicators (female's work on the farm, male's work off the farm, female's work off the farm, and hired labor use on the farm), by adding up the marginal effects on the eight categories in which the relevant participation indicator obtains the value of unity. It is easier to interpret the marginal effects in this way. These are reported in table 4. Each marginal effect is accompanied by a pair of numbers in parentheses. The first number is the number of significant coefficients that have the same sign as the marginal effect, in the eight categories in which the relevant participation indicator obtains the value of unity. The second number is the number of significant coefficients that have a sign that is opposite to the sign of the marginal effect, in these same eight categories. Hence, the most reliable marginal effects are those that are accompanied by a (8,0) pair. The least reliable would be a marginal effect that is accompanied by a (0,8) pair.
The sum of the two numbers in a pair could be at most eight. Eight minus the sum is the number of insignificant coefficients.
Starting with the personal characteristics, we find that an individual's age is negatively related to his/her off-farm work participation. This is true at the sample means, note in table 3 that the effects of age are nonlinear. Male and female ages have other significant effects, but one has to be cautions about these effects because the age coefficients are potentially contaminated by multicollinearity. Male agricultural education is negatively related to his off-farm work participation, while female agricultural education is positively related to her farm work participation and to the male's off-farm work participation. Male general education, on the other hand, is positively related to his off-farm work participation and to the female's farm work participation. Female general education is positively related to her off-farm work participation. It seems like the female's farm labor substitutes for the male's farm labor when she has more agricultural education and when he has more general education. Hired labor responds positively to all levels of education, both agricultural and general, of both the male and the female. The effect of agricultural education on hired labor could be due to an income effect: more educated farmers are more efficient, make more money on the farm, and afford to hire workers while devoting part of their own labor input to managerial tasks or even increase their leisure activities. The effect of general education on hired labor could be due to both income and substitution effects, as these effects work in the same direction. Training of either the male or the female has similar effects as agricultural education, and years of farm experience have similar effects as male agricultural education.
Children and adolescents are negatively related to both spouses' off-farm labor participation. Children up to age six are also negatively related to the spouse's farm labor participation. Other adults in the household are positively related to the couple's off-farm labor participation and negatively related to the female's farm labor participation and to hired labor. It seems like other adults substitute for the farm labor input of both the farm couple and hired workers.
We now turn to the farm attributes. Receiving a set-up subsidy since 1988 is negatively related to the couple's off-farm work participation and to the use of hired labor, but also to the female's farm work participation. Perhaps this variable is correlated with being a relatively young family and hence with the number of young children. Structural improvement on the farm is also negatively related to the couple's off-farm work participation, but is positively related to the female's farm work participation and to the use of hired labor. These farms are likely to be more productive hence require more labor input due to a scale effect. Family composition variables represent the demand for labor in household tasks (children) or the supply of labor (other adults). These affect both male and female similarly, and the correlations with hired labor are similar in sign to the correlations with female's farm labor participation. The effects of the number of other adults indicate that other adult substitute for the farm labor of the farm couple and also for hired labor. This conclusion may be relevant for policies that aim to promote farm succession by adult children of farm couples, but more work is required in this direction (see Kimhi 2001) .
Unlike the conclusions of Benjamin, Corsi and Guyomard (1996) , we find that the females' time allocation responds to farm-related incentives just as the males', and we also find that the females' farm labor substitutes for males' farm labor in certain circumstances. In addition, we find that hired labor mostly complements both male and female farm labor. Perhaps what we see here is an increased sharing of tasks and responsibilities of males and females, both on and off the farm, relative to earlier years.
Including the female's farm work participation among the dependent variables seems to be important. Not only are many coefficients of regime 1 statistically significant (table 3) , it can easily be seen that the coefficients of regimes 2-8 are quite different from the coefficients of regimes 10-16. Hence, without taking explicit account of the female's farm labor participation, the results could have been qualitatively different.
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